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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1- Whether the Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over this case. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in concluding that Respondent's 
business had not increased in value? 
substantiating a finding that he shoulo 
receive the business assets and correlating 
debts in the property settlement froB and 
clear of any claim by Appellant* 
REFERENCE TO OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision 
- - - Filed November 3, 1987 
Court of Appeals Decision denying Petition 
for Rehearing - - - Filed November 30, 193? 
JURISDICTION 
"here is no jurisdiction in this Court. 
1. Date of entry of Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari filed March 3, 1998. 
S- Order denying Petition for rehearing filed 
November 30, 1987. 
3. Controlling statutory provisions. Rules H 3 
through H 6 , Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Rules H 2 through ^6, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
<See Appendix). 
Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 
(1) When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the 
Court may include in it5 equitable orders-
relating to the property. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Tiature of the Case 
This is an appeal bv Defendant/Rppel1 anfc from a 
Court of Appeals decision denying a rehearing. 
The Court of Appeals* m a November 1987 decision? 
affirmed the trial court's property distribution 
at a di\orce proceeding and concluded that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining the value of certain business assets 
and related encumbrances. 
Course of Proceed 1 tigs 
A Decree of Divorce was rendered Januarv S3. 198^. 
by the Honorable David E. Poth. of the Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County. State of 
Utah. It was ordered, "that Plaintiff be awarded 
his business and the machinery and equipment free 
and clear of any claim of the Defendant.'1 This 
division of property was disputed by 
Defe id an t ' Ap pel Ian t . 
~"
Ke Covri cf Appeals, in Horrrsble Judith 1-
3iilings1 Memorandum Decision, found that there 
was an equitable proper^ division, tha4" no 
serious inequity resulted? and that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
such a property division. 
(CA Decision, p.2, November 3, 199^) 
A Petition for rehearing was subsequently denied 
on November 25, 1^87. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of 
Divorce entered on January 28. 1987. Said decree 
was granted pursuant to a trial on the matter and 
said decree provided» inter alia, that, olamtiff. 
during the course of the marriage, had acquired 
other items of equipment and machinery wnich, when 
considering the encumbrances listed by the 
plaintiff have not resulted m anv increased value 
of that equipment although the plaintiff still 
retains his original $5i0O0.O0 equitv value". 
(Para. 6, Conclusions of Law) The court stated m 
the Conclusions of Law. (para. 7; "Lt]hat 
olamtiff should be agarose nis easiness. 
machinery and equipment connected therewith free 
and clear of anv claim o^ " the [defendarf ] . " 
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Appellant petitioned for s reneasing 0 + the Court 
of Appeal7 s decision, and was denied a rehearing 
on November 25^ 1987. Appellant? then? filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme 
Court5 and said Petition was filed on March 3% 
L9S8- (Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of 
Utah, dated March 3, 1988.) 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THIS 
CASE AS THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT GOVERNING A PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT HAVE NOT 
BEEN FOLLOWED. 
Rule 43 through 46 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court enumerate the procedures to be followed and factors 
to be considered for review of a Court of Appeals 
decision in the Supreme Court. 
Rule 43 of the Rules cf the Utah Supreme Court states 
tnat a petition for review of certiorari will be granted 
only when there ace special and important reasons. While 
emphasizing that review is not a matter of right but of 
judicial discretion, the court indicates factors that 
will be considered upon a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. These factors include: 
1. When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with the 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
2. When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal 
law i ?i a way that is in conflict with the 
decision of this court; 
-**-
3. When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so 
far sanctioned such a departure by a 
lower court as to call for an exercise of 
this Court's power of supervision; or 
4. When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal? state? 
or federal law which has not been* but 
should be? settled by this court. 
Nowhere in Appellant's brief does she indicate special 
and important reasons why the Supreme Court should review 
the decision of the Court of Appeals? or that the 
decision of the Court of Appeals has departed from the 
acceptable and usual course of judicial proceedings? or 
fchat it sanctioned such a departure by the lower court. 
Appellant fails to cite any Utah statutory or case law 
that would show in any way that the Court of Appeals or 
the trial court was wrong in its decision. Instead? she 
uses irrelevant arguments and asks whether Utah law 
permits such a division of marital and separate property. 
The answer is an unequivocal "yes". 
The Court of Appeals based its decision in the instant 
case on the Supreme Court's decision in Burke v. Burke? 
733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). (Court of Appeals 
decision? Page 2 ) . The Burke decision clearly outlines 
factors a trial court should consider in determining an 
equitable property division. The Court of Appeals? in 
this instant case? found that there was an equitable 
-5-
property division? that no serious inequity resulted? and 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining such a property division. 
Rules 44 and 45 of the Supreme Court provide for 
docketing fees and the time for petitioning. A Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of 
this Court within thirty (30) days after the entry of the 
decision by the Court of Appeals? not from the date of he 
issuance of the remittitur in a petition for rehearing 
(Rule 45(c)). Also? the petitioner shall "pay the 
Certiorari docketing fee within the time provided by Rule 
45. (Rule 44 Rules of the Utah Supreme Court) 
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case denying 
th& petition for rehearing was dated on November £5? 
1937, and filed on November 30, 1987. Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed on or about 
March 3, 1988, f&r beyond the time allowed for 
jurisdictional purposes. In addition, Appellant failed 
to pay a filing fee when she filed. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that filing without paying 
a fee is not a filing. In Prowsewood Inc. v Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, hlh P.£d 952 (Utah 1984) The Court 
states that "Leaving a paper with a filing officer, a fee 
for the filing of which is by statute required to be paid 
in advance, is not a filing." This case was dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that filing a 
petition for appeal required two acts? the payment of 
fees and the delivery of the record to the clerk. 
Filing a timely notice of appeal is an absolute 
jurisdictional pre-requisite to appealing a decision. In 
Anderson v. Anderson, 888 P .2d 6^5 (Utah 1955), the 
Defendant was committed to jail under a contempt order 
divorce proceeding. A petition to vacate the contempt 
order was denied. Defendant attempted to appeal? 
however? his petition was filed one month and one day 
after the district court's order. At this time* it must 
be noted that Appellant had "one month1* rather than 
thirty days to appeal from a final order. A motion to 
dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds was made. 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, the Court stated: 
It is thus clear that this appeal was not taken in 
time* that the failure to do so is jurisdictional 
and noticeable by the court sua sponte. The appeal 
is dismissed with costs to the respondent. (282 
P.Ed at 8^+8. ) 
In estate of Mary Rati iff v. Conrad, 4-31 P.Ed 571 
(Utah 1967) Appellant lost a probate proceeding. Her 
motion for new trial was denied on March 1. On April 8, 
her notice of appeal was filed. The other party in the 
law suit moved bo dismiss the appeal? and the Utah 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Court stated: 
- 7 -
Since the notice was filed more than one month 
after the entry of judgement? or the order appealed 
from (Rule 73(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure)? 
this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the 
appeal and it is therefore compelled to order a 
dismissal thereof. 
Appeal dismissed. Costs to respondents. (4-31 P.2d at 
573, 574-) In the instant case? we are dealing with a 
slightly different rule. The Appellant had thirty (30) 
days to file a notice of appeal? instead of one month. 
Nevertheless? it is still clear that failure to file a 
notice of appeal within thirty (30) days precludes the 
Court from exercising jurisdiction over this appeal. 
The fact that jurisdiction cannot be waived even if 
the parties were to consent to a waiver was stressed in 
the recent case of Thompson v, Jackson? 6'^  UAR 13 (Utah 
Court of Appeals? October 2? 1997). Reversing a circuit 
court's ruling which purported to deal with matters 
involving real property and money in excess of 
$ 10?000„00? the Court stated: "Culpon a determination by 
the Court that its jurisdiction is lacking? its authority 
extends no further than to dismiss the action." 67 UAR 
at 14. 
The fact that Appellant has also failed to file her 
filing fees within the time required by Rule 44 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court is further justification 
for this Court to dismiss the appeal. 
Rule 46(a) enumerates the contents required for a 
-8 -
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. In Koulis v. Standard 
Gil Company of California, 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1987), the 
court states that all statements of facts in reference to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record as required in Rule 24(a)(7). This case 
states that this Supreme Court rule is subject to the 
same interpretation and it is an identical rule. If a 
party fails to make a concise statement of fact and 
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are 
supported? the court will assume the correctness of the 
judgment below and may not and will not consider any 
facts not properly cited to or supported by the record. 
(746 P.2d at 1184). 
The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 24 of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court? indicates the rules purpose: 
"Inadequate appellant briefs, which do not significantly 
assist the court in disposing of the case before it, have 
proved to be a significant problem. In order to 
alleviate this concern, this rule clearly specifies the 
required contents and order of each brief." 
Appellant's petition is full of allegations not 
supported by the record. Her brief can fairly be 
described as being filled with burdensome, emotional? 
immaterial and inaccurate arguments indicating little? if 
any? legal support for her allegations. Therefore, the 
Court should disregard her brief on appeal and assume the 
-9-
correctness of the judgments below and find that t he-
trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
II 
THE DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY AND 
PERFORCE OF MARITAL DEBTS IS A MATTER 
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT, IS CLOAKED WITH PRESUMPTION OF 
VALIDITY, AND WILL NOT BE DISTURBED 
ABSENT A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION (CASE 
LAW FOLLOWING A PROPERTY DIVISION UNDER 
UTAH CODE 30-3-5(1)). 
The trial court found in it's Findings of Fact that 
the dirt hauling business had accumulated items of 
equipment during the marriage? but that considering the 
encumbrances? the new equipment had not meant an increase 
in business asset value to Mr. Wilcock. That conclusion 
is based upon the exhibits presented to the court and the 
testimony of the parties and witnesses. Within certain 
limits that have been set by the Supreme Court? the trial 
court may make such orders in relation to the parties as 
may be equitable- The trial court in a divorce action is 
permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial Biid property interest of the parties.... 
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P- Ed 781 (Utah 19S6). 
The trial court need not make a distribution that is 
equal to the parties. Despite Ms. Dunkley's constant 
reference to a 50/50 relationship and characterizing the 
business as a "partnership", the trial court must take 
-10-
into consideration a number of factors in distributing 
property after a divorce*. including the amount and kind 
of property; whether the property was acquired before or 
during the marriage; the source of the property; the 
parties standard of living; respective financial 
condition; needs? and earning capacity; the duration of 
the marriage; what the parties gave up by the marriage? 
and the necessary relationship the property division has 
with the amount of alimony. Burke v. Burke? 733? 135 
(Utah 1987). 
The trial court held in it's Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce that Ms. Dunk ley had not shown by the 
evidence that Mr. Uiicock had been benefitted 39?500.00 
by her contributions to the business. The factual 
findings indicated that the equipment had been encumbered 
and the ultimate value of the business was the same prior 
to as it was after the marriage- In reviewing a property 
division made by a trial court? the Supreme Court endows 
its decision with a presumption of validity and does not 
disturb the decree absent a clear abuse of discretion or 
manifest injustice or inequity, Stephens v. Stephens? 
729 P.2d 991 (Utah 1986). 
This case fails to support a clear abuse of discretion 
or inequity. Ms. Dunkley added her time and effort to 
the business? profited by those actions during the 
marriage? and left the marriage and the business in 
-11-
about the same financial condition as they were when she 
entered- The trial judge did not burden her with the 
business debts and left the business in the hands of Mr. 
Wilcock with its value the same as when the marriage took 
place. 
In order to successfully attack a trial court's 
Findings ot t-act? an Appellant must marshall all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings." Scharf v. BMC3 
Corporation, 700 P.Ed 1069 (Utah 1965). 
The record and exhibits clearly show that the funds 
were commingled to such a degree that it was impossible 
to determine exactly what Ms. Dunk ley spent for the 
business during the years. Ms. Dunkley received the 
benefits of the business during the marriage while she 
was contributing time and effort to make it profitable. 
The business showed a loss in 1983 and 1^9^ as 
demonstrated by the parties joint tax returns (Exhibits 
15 & 16). The record shows that some of the business-
equipment purchased during the marriage was repaired? 
advertised for sale? and then sold or traded. Ms. 
Dunkley benefitted from these transactions directly. 
Although business equipment was purchased -~ind retained 
encumbrances on the business offset any value they may 
have. The incorporation by fir. Wilcock did not disturb 
the ability Gf the court to clearly identify and value 
the equipment purchased during the marriage* or calculate 
the debt of the business. 
Viewed most favorable to Mr. Wilcock? evidence 
presented at trial indicates that the value of the 
business at the time of divorce was nearly the same as it 
was when the marriage took place. Two appraisals were 
taken showing bhe accumulated* equipment assets to be 
valued at approximately $30?000.00. Against these assets 
are liabilities totaling $2^,239.21. The trial court 
added to the liabilities the $5,000.00 value of the 
business before marriage anc^ determined no imzrsasB had 
taken place. The evidence shown at trial was more than 
sufficient to support the findings of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Rules of the Supreme Court regarding 
review of an Appellate Court's decision have not been 
followed? this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this 
appeal. Furthermore? Appellant has not shown that the 
trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital 
property. Respondents ask the court to dismiss the case 
and to award them attorney's fees and costs against 
-13-
Appellant pursuant to Hule d3(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
DATED this JL((i day of April, 1938. 
^ A 
STEVEN R. BAILEY 
Attorney for Piainti ff/Respondent 
Carolyn D. Z^uthen 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Fred J. Wilcock, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Joan Wilcock Dunkley, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for publication) 
Case No- 870069-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Davidson, and Jackson, F I L E D 
NOV 0 31987 
BILLINGS, Judge: Timothy M.Stea 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's property-
distribution in this divorce action, requesting that she 
receive a share of the parties' sand and gravel hauling 
business assets. We affirm the district court. 
The parties were married four years. Both had prior 
marriages. No children were born to the couple. Defendant, 53 
at the time of trial, was the primary wage earner during the 
marriage. Plaintiff was 56 at the time of trial, and operated 
a business, owning equipment worth approximately $5000 when he 
married defendant. During their marriage, the parties began to 
commingle their funds in hopes of building a profitable dirt 
hauling business. They subsequently purchased and traded 
various pieces of equipment, simultaneously encumbering many of 
the assets to finance each purchase. For the period 1982-1985, 
their business showed only one profitable year, incurring a 
loss in each of the other years. Both parties contributed to 
the operation of the business. 
At trial, two separate appraisers, and plaintiff, valued 
the business equipment at approximately $30,000. However, the 
equipment was encumbered by $24,289.21 in liens. The testimony 
at trial supported, and the trial court found, that plaintiff 
had $5000 worth of equipment before the marriage. Based on the 
foregoing, the trial court found that the items of equipment 
and machinery acquired during the marriage had not appreciated 
in value. Furthermore/ the business had little if any value as 
an ongoing concern. It had made a profit in only one of its 
four years of operation. Therefore, the business, machinery, 
and equipment were awarded to plaintiff, free and clear of any 
claim of defendant. The court awarded plaintiff the residence 
he had owned prior to the marriage, and ordered plaintiff to 
pay $100 per month alimony to defendant for *six (6) years. 
Defendant was awarded $3,425, one-half of the sum defendant 
took from the parties' checking account, and judgment against 
the plaintiff in the sum of $4000 for the savings she took into 
the marriage. In addition, defendant was awarded her 
automobile, free and clear of any interest of plaintiff. 
I. 
Defendant's sole contention of error is that the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding the business and its 
assets to plaintiff, free and clear of any claim of defendant. 
Defendant claims that the trial court's valuation of the 
business assets was incorrect, resulting in an unjust 
enrichment of the plaintiff at her expense. 
On review, we accord considerable deference to the trial 
court, and will not disturb the action of the court unless 
"'there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; or the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion."* Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, No. 860128-CA, slip op. at 2 
(Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1987)(quoting Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 
753 (Utah 1978)). 
In Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court enumerated the factors a trial court should 
consider in "fashioning an equitable property division." 
The factors generally to be considered are 
the amount and kind of property to be 
divided; whether the property was 
acquired before or during the marriage; 
the source of the property; the health of 
the parties; the parties' standard of 
living, respective financial conditions, 
needs, and earning capacity; the duration 
of the marriage; the parties' ages at 
time of marriage and of divorce; what the 
870069-CA -Ifc-
parties gave up by the marriages and the 
necessary relationship the property 
division has with the amount of alimony 
and child support to be awarded. 
Burke at 135. 
Based upon the facts in the record, the trial court 
properly concluded that the business equipment assets had not 
appreciated during the marriage. The court fashioned a total 
award to put the parties in the position they were in when they 
entered this short term marriage. The evidence does not 
preponderate against the trial court's findings, nor has a 
serious inequity resulted. Accordingly, we affirm the Divorce 
Decree as entered. Each party shall bear his/her own costs on 
appeal. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
870069-CA 3 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Fred J. Wilcock, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Joan Wilcock, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
NOV S01987 
J ifficthy M. Shea 
Clark of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 870069-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter, and the Court 
having duly considered said petition/ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing be denied. 
Dated this 25th day of November, 1987. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Timothy M. shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Brian R. Florence #1091 
of FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
Attorney for Defendant 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
399-9291 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRED J. WILCOCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOAN DODGE WILCOCK, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C i v i l No. 94538 
ORENCE 
and 
TCHISON 
ORNEYS AT 
LAW 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 
19th day of November, 19 86, before the Honorable 
David E. Roth, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, plaintiff present and represented by 
counsel, George B. Handy, and defendant present and 
represented by counsel, Brian R. Florence, and the parties 
having been duly sworn and testified, and the Court having 
been fully advised in the premises, now files its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff and defendant are actual and 
bona-fide residents of Weber County, State of Utah, and 
have been for more than three months prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant are husband and 
*6TH STREET 
ORENCE 
and 
TCHISON 
3RNEYSAT 
LAW 
56TH STREET 
WILCOCK v. WILCOCK 
Civil No. 94538 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Page 2 
wife, having been married to each other on 
January 22, 1982 in Ogden, Utah. 
3. That no children have been born as issue of 
this marriage and none are expected. 
4. That each of the parties had previously been 
married and had acquired property during said marriages. 
Plaintiff had certain real property upon which was situated 
a residence, together with $5,000.00 worth of machinery and 
equipment. Defendant had $4,000.00 in cash in a savings 
account and was receiving $400.00 per month alimony. At 
the conclusion of this marriage, defendant has no cash and 
no alimony and as a result of the marriage, she is poorer. 
5. That during the marriage, plaintiff had made 
approximately $3,000.00 of improvements on the residence. 
That $4,000.00 of defendant's funds had been used for 
family expenses. Defendant had acquired a 1982 Buick 
automobile. 
6. That plaintiff, during the course of the 
marriage, had acquired other items of equipment and 
machinery which, when considering the encumbrances listed 
by the plaintiff, have not resulted in any increased value 
of that equipment although the plaintiff still retains his 
RNEYS AT 
LAW 
WILCOCK v. WILCOCK 
Civil No. 94538 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Page 3 
)RENCE 
and 
€HISON 
original $5,000.00 equity value. 
7. That the dispute on the debt at America First 
Credit Union is no longer an issue in that it is paid and 
they are no longer holding the defendant responsible. 
Plaintiff has listed that debt on his schedule as an 
obligation to his mother and has claimed it as an off-set 
against the value of his property. 
8. That defendant is employed at Hill Air Force 
Base and has accrued $4,000.00 of retirement benefits 
during the marriage of the parties. 
9. That at the present time, plaintiff is capable 
of making $1,000.00 or $1,200.00 per month. There is some 
cause for speculation that he might be able to make more 
based upon what the company earned in 198 5 and based upon 
the fact that the bookkeeping of the company is pretty 
sloppy. Based upon the testimony of the parties and the 
plaintiff's partner, it is not realistic to expect that the 
plaintiff is going to average more than $1,000.00 per month 
net. 
From the foregoing Facts, the Court now makes and 
files its: 
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£>RENCE 
and 
ITCHISON 
ORNEYS AT 
LAW 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That each of the parties should be awarded a 
Decree of Divorce from the other and said Decree should 
become final immediately upon its being signed and filed 
with the Clerk of this Court. 
2. That defendant should not be required to 
reimburse the plaintiff for the value of the clothing she 
took when she left the domicile of the parties. 
3. That plaintiff should be awarded, free and 
clear of any claim of the defendant, the real property and 
the residence situated thereon, together with all 
improvements. As an off-set, defendant should be awarded 
all of her accrued retirement benefits at Hill Air Force 
Base. 
4. That plaintiff should not be required to 
reimburse defendant the $9,500.00 allegedly invested in 
plaintiff's business. 
5. That defendant should be awarded one-half of 
the sum of $6,850.00 or $3,425.00 from the sum taken from 
the parties1 checking account. 
6. That defendant should be awarded alimony in the 
sum of $100.00 per month for a period of six years based 
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upon the finding that defendant is only capable of making 
$1,00Q.00 to $1,200.00 per month. 
7. That plaintiff should be awarded his business, 
machinery and equipment connected therewith free and clear 
of any claim of the plaintiff. 
8. That judgment should be awarded in favor of the 
defendant against the plaintiff in the sum of $4,000.00 for 
the savings she took into the marriage. 
9. That both parties should be required to pay 
their own attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
10. That defendant should be restored to her 
former surname of DUNKLEY. 
11. That defendant should be awarded the 1982 
Buick automobile free and clear of any interest in the 
plaintiff. 
DATED this day of , 198 7. 
BY THE COURT: 
ORENCE 
and 
TCHISON 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DAVID E. ROTH, Judge 
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Attorney for Plaintiff WILCOCK/N 
